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Abstract— The problem of security against timing based traffic
analysis in wireless networks is considered in this work. An
analytical measure of anonymity in eavesdropped networks is
proposed using the information theoretic concept of equivocation.
For a physical layer with orthogonal transmitter directed signal-
ing, scheduling and relaying techniques are designed to maximize
achievable network performance for any given level of anonymity.
The network performance is measured by the achievable relay
rates from the sources to destinations under latency and medium
access constraints. In particular, analytical results are presented
for two scenarios:
For a two-hop network with maximum anonymity, achievable
rate regions for a general m × 1 relay are characterized when
nodes generate independent Poisson transmission schedules. The
rate regions are presented for both strict and average delay
constraints on traffic flow through the relay.
For a multihop network with an arbitrary anonymity re-
quirement, the problem of maximizing the sum-rate of flows
(network throughput) is considered. A selective independent
scheduling strategy is designed for this purpose, and using
the analytical results for the two-hop network, the achievable
throughput is characterized as a function of the anonymity level.
The throughput-anonymity relation for the proposed strategy is
shown to be equivalent to an information theoretic rate-distortion
function.
Index Terms— Network Security, Traffic Analysis, Secrecy,
Rate-Distortion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traffic analysis attacks are carried out by eavesdroppers
monitoring node transmissions to obtain networking informa-
tion such as source-destination pairs and paths of data flow.
Traffic analysis has played a prominent role in modern warfare
[1] and its adverse effects on computer networks is well
documented in literature [2], [3], [4], [5]. For example, the
weaknesses of protocols for web browsing [4], [6] and SSH
[7] have been exposed through traffic analysis.
The primary focus of this work is an analytical approach
to security against traffic analysis in wireless networks and
the design of provably secure countermeasures. Owing to the
unprotected medium of communication, eavesdropping node
transmissions in wireless networks is easy and undetectable.
Although cryptography can be used to prevent analysis based
on contents or packet lengths (see Section I-B), the knowledge
of transmission epochs alone can reveal critical information
such as paths of information flow. We address the problem
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of designing anonymous transmission schedules and relaying
strategies to counter the transmission epoch based inference
of data flows by eavesdroppers.
The challenge in designing anonymous transmission strate-
gies is to adhere to the networking constraints while hiding
information from eavesdroppers. Wireless networks are subject
to constraints on medium access, latency and stability, which
generally result in a high correlation across transmission
schedules of nodes in a path. The need for anonymity however
necessitates that paths are not revealed by correlation of
transmission schedules. These contrasting paradigms result
in a tradeoff between anonymity and network performance.
For example, consider the simple two hop setup shown in
Fig. 1, wherein node B relays packets received from nodes
S1 and S2 subject to a strict delay constraint. Assuming
the nodes use orthogonal channels, if the transmission rates
R1, R2 are bounded, then the rates of packets that can be
relayed successfully is given by a pentagon (solid line in Fig.
1). Rates in this region are achieved if the relay transmits
every received packet after a small processing delay. It is easy
to see that such a strategy would result in a high correlation
between the source and relay schedules. If, in addition to
the networking constraints, the source and relay schedules are
forced to be statistically independent, an eavesdropper would
not detect correlation across schedules, thus hiding the relaying
operation. The delay constraint may, however, result in packet
drops or require dummy transmissions thereby reducing the
achievable relay rates.
The relaying operation of Figure 1 represents the basic
component in wireless networking, and the characterization
of the achievable rate region with provable anonymity is one
of the contributions of this work. The example highlights that
providing anonymity in communication requires a reduction
in communication rates. A primary goal of this work is to
characterize this trade-off between anonymity and network
performance. An analytical approach for the characterization
requires a quantifiable notion of anonymity, which we mea-
sure using the uncertainty in networking information (ac-
tive routes in the network) inferable by the adversary. The
example discussed suggests a simple technique to provide
perfect anonymity by letting all nodes generate statistically
independent schedules, but this strategy may not provide
scalable performance for large networks. Our goal is to design
transmission strategies that sacrifice minimum performance
while maintaining a certain level of anonymity.
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(a) Sources S1, S2 transmit packets to Desti-
nations D1, D2 through Relay B
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(b) Achievable Rate Region : The horizontal and
vertical boundaries are due to rate constraints C1, C2
on nodes S1, S2. The sum-rate constraint is due to
stability at relay B. The inner region (in dotted line)
represents the achievable rate region with independent
scheduling that we wish to characterize.
Fig. 1: Two Hop Relay Network
A. Main Contributions
We propose an analytical framework for anonymous
scheduling against traffic analysis in wireless networks. In
particular, we define a mathematical notion for anonymity of
routes, based on Shannon’s equivocation [8], when eavesdrop-
pers observe transmission epochs of all nodes in the network.
The main results obtained under this model are divided into
two segments.
Assuming maximum anonymity requirement, we design
scheduling and relaying strategies for a two hop multiple
source single relay system (see Fig. 4) when nodes use
orthogonal transmitter directed signaling. In particular, when
the transmission schedules of nodes are independent Poisson
processes, we characterize the achievable rate region analyt-
ically. Although independent Poisson scheduling may not be
optimal for a strict delay constraint on the relay, we show
that, under certain physical layer conditions, the achievable
relay rates are optimal for an average delay constraint.
For a general multihop network, we propose a randomized
scheduling strategy for any given level of anonymity α, and
utilizing the results of the two hop system, characterize the
achievable sum-rate of data flows as a function of α. Our key
result in this framework shows the equivalence between the
sum-rate anonymity tradeoff and information theoretic rate-
distortion.
The connection between rate distortion and anonymous
networking is not tied to our strategy and can be explained
using a general intuition. The objective of the rate-distortion
problem is to generate fewest number of codewords for a set of
source sequences, such that the corresponding reconstruction
sequences satisfy a specified distortion constraint. The idea
is to divide the set of source sequences into fewest number
of bins such that the distortion between each sequence in a
bin and the reconstruction sequence is less than the specified
constraint. Alternatively, fixing the code rate fixes the total
number of bins. Then, the sequences are placed optimally
within each bin such that the corresponding reconstruction
sequences minimize the expected distortion.
In the anonymous networking setup, let the set of active
routes at any given time be referred to as a network session.
The key idea is to divide the set of all possible network
sessions into bins such that, for each bin, there exists a
scheduling strategy that would make the sessions within
that bin indistinguishable to an eavesdropper. The level of
anonymity required determines the number of bins, and the
optimal scheduling strategy plays the role of the reconstruction
sequence by minimizing the performance loss across sessions
within the bin.
B. Related Work
Although prevention of traffic analysis is a classical prob-
lem, a dominant portion of prior research has centered around
Internet applications. In that regard, an important countermea-
sure was provided by Chaum through the concept of the traffic
Mix [9]. A Mix node uses re-encryption and packet padding
to prevent correlation based on contents or lengths across
packets. Further, by batching and reordering packets, the Mix
provides anonymity of source-destination pairs. Subsequent
improvements in the anonymity provided by the Mix included
random delaying (Stop-and-Go Mixes [10]) and introducing
dummy packets (ISDN Mixes [11]). The concept of Mixes
was successfully used in designing remailer and proxy systems
[12], [13], [14] for the Internet.
Although Mixes provide an ideal solution for many Internet
applications, when strict constraints on delay or buffer size
are imposed, it was shown [15] that a Mix no longer provided
anonymity to long streams of traffic. An alternative approach,
designed primarily for multihop wireless networks is that of
deterministic scheduling [16]. In [16], the authors propose a
fixed periodic schedule for the entire network, wherein every
node adhered to the schedule by transmitting dummy packets
whenever actual data was not present. Although the idea of
fixed scheduling can be adapted to handle delay constraints,
constant transmission of dummy packets is inefficient and
furthermore, the centralized synchronous implementation is
impractical for ad hoc wireless networks.
A key component of our approach is the analytical model
for anonymity of routes. In mix networks, anonymity has been
measured using the size or entropy of the anonymity set (set
of possible source-destination pairs) of an observed packet.
In the context of this work, the use of anonymity sets has
two disadvantages. First, hiding source-destination pairs alone
may not be sufficient, the direction of data flow could also
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reveal critical information. Second, the measure of anonymity
needs to cater to streams of packets rather than a single packet
[15]. Our metric for anonymity is based on the information
theoretic notion of equivocation, proposed by Shannon [8].
Previous applications of equivocation measured the secrecy of
transmitted data on point-to-point channels [17], [18], whereas
we use equivocation to measure the secrecy of routes in a
network.
Prevention of traffic analysis can also be viewed as the
complementary problem to intrusion detection [19], which
is another important area in network security. Some of the
techniques we use to design anonymous relaying strategies
are motivated by prior work on stepping stone detection [20].
II. ANALYTICAL MODEL
The main problem addressed in this paper is to design
transmission and relaying strategies that are resilient to traffic
analysis and use them to characterize the relationship between
achievable network performance and the level of anonymity.
We consider a specific category of delay sensitive traffic and
measure the network performance using achievable packet
relay rates from source to destination.
A. Notation
Let G = (V , E) be a directed graph, where V is the
set of nodes in the network and E ⊂ V × V is the set
of directed links. If (A,B) is an element of E , then node
B can receive transmissions from node A. A sequence of
nodes P = (V1, · · · , Vn) ∈ V∗ is a valid path∗ in G if
(Vi, Vi+1) ∈ E , ∀i < n. The set of all possible paths in G
is denoted by P(G).
We assume that during any network observation by the
eavesdropper, a subset of nodes communicate using a fixed
set of paths. This set of paths S ∈ 2P(G) is referred to as a
network session. The information that we wish to hide from
the eavesdropper is the network session S. We model S as
an i.i.d. random variable with a probability mass function
{p(s) : s ∈ 2P(G)}. Therefore,the set of all possible sessions
is given by
S = {s ∈ 2P(G) : p(s) > 0}.
The prior information p(S) on sessions can be obtained
using the topology and applications of the particular network,
and is also available to the eavesdropper.
For example, in a simple network G1 as shown in Figure 2,
let S1, S2 be the only allowed sources and D1, D2 the allowed
destinations. Further, let the sources always communicate with
distinct destinations. For such a network, P(G1), the set of all
possible paths, is given by
P(G1) = { (S1, B), (S1, B,D1), (S1, B,D2), (S2, B),
(S2, B,D1), (S2, B,D2), (B,D1), (B,D2) }.
Due to the restriction on distinct destinations, the set of valid
sessions S contains only two sessions:
S = { {(S1, B,D1), (S2, B,D2)}
{(S1, B,D2), (S2, B,D1)}}.
∗The notation V∗ refers to
S
i V
i
.
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Fig. 2: Two Node Switching Network: G1 = (V , E),
V1 = {S1, S2, B,D1, D2},
E1 = {(S1, B), (S2, B), (B,D1), (B,D2)}.
Transmission Schedules The eavesdropper’s observation con-
sists of the packet transmission epochs in a session. Since it
is not possible to determine the location of the eavesdrop-
per(s), we assume that all transmissions are being monitored.
Although the packets are encrypted, depending on the physical
layer model, it may be possible for an eavesdropper to infer
partial information about sender-receiver nodes of packets
by merely detecting a transmission. We consider one such
physical layer model known as a transmitter directed signaling
model.
Transmitter Directed Signaling: All packets transmitted by
a particular node are modulated using the same spreading
sequence, and each transmitting node is associated with
a unique orthogonal spreading sequence. Under this
transmission scheme, an eavesdropper would be able to
“tune” his detector to a particular spreading sequence
and detect the transmission times of packets sent by the
corresponding node. Although he knows the transmitting
node of each packet, we assume that headers are encrypted,
so he would not know the intended recipient of any packet.
Therefore, in a route involving multiple nodes, even when all
transmission schedules are correlated, it is not possible for an
eavesdropper to ascertain the final destination node.
Eavesdropper Observation Let YA represent the schedule of
packets transmitted by node A. The schedule YA is a point
process,
YA = {YA(1), YA(2), · · · },
where YA(i) represents the transmission epoch of the ith
packet by node A. The eavesdropper detects packet trans-
mission epochs which, by virtue of unique orthogonal codes,
would provide him the identity of the transmitting node.
Since we assume all nodes are monitored, the eavesdropper’s
complete observation is given by Y = {YA : A ∈ V}.
Note that, while Y represents the schedules of packet
transmissions detected by eavesdroppers, it does not specify
which packets are relayed from sources to destinations in a
session. In fact, some of the epochs in Y could represent
dummy transmissions by nodes.
B. Anonymity Measure
We model Y as a random sequence of epochs with con-
ditional distribution q(Y|S). The idea is to design q(Y|S)
such that eavesdroppers obtain minimum information about
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the session S by observing Y . Based on the information we
wish to hide (S) and the observation of the eavesdropper (Y),
we use equivocation [8] to define the analytical measure of
anonymity.
Definition 1: A distribution q(Y|S) is defined to have
anonymity α if
H(S|Y)
H(S)
≥ α.
When α = 1, the distribution q(Y|S) is defined to have
perfect anonymity. For a distribution with perfect anonymity,
given the observed schedules, the eavesdropper gains no
additional information (than the prior p(S)) about the routes.
In other words,
H(S|Y) = H(S).
For a general α, a physical interpretation of anonymity
can be obtained using Fano’s Inequality [21]: Let the error
probability of the eavesdropper in decoding the session S be
Pe. Then,
Pe ≥
H(S|Y) − 1
log |S|
≥
αH(S)− 1
log |S|
.
Furthermore, if S is a large set with uniform prior {p(s) =
1
|S| , ∀s}, then Pe ≥ α. In other words, the anonymity bounds
the minimum probability of error incurred by the eavesdropper
in decoding S.
This notion of anonymity that we consider is different
from previous definitions [22], [10], which were primarily
used to hide the source-destination pair of each individual
packet. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first definition
of anonymity that deals with multihop routes and considers
timing information in long streams of transmitted packets.
C. Network Constraints and Throughput
The key challenge in designing the schedule distribution
q(Y|S) with provable anonymity is to sacrifice minimum
performance under the networking constraints. In this work,
we measure performance using the achievable rates of packets
relayed from sources to destinations subject to constraints
on medium access and latency, which are described as follows.
Medium Access Constraints Wireless networks, due to re-
strictions on shared bandwidth and transmission power, pose
constraints on rates of packets transmitted and received. We
consider long streams of packet transmissions, and measure
the rate of packets transmitted using an asymptotic measure:
TA = lim
n→∞
n
YA(n)
, (1)
where TA denotes the rate of packets transmitted by a node A.
Since each transmitting node is associated with an orthogonal
spreading sequence, the constraint on each point process in
Y is independent. Specifically, the transmission rate TA of a
node A is bounded by a constant CA, which depends on the
characteristics of the medium and the transmission capability
of node A. As long as TA ≤ CA, successful reception is
guaranteed at the intended receiver.
We assume that the network operates in full duplex
mode, where every node can transmit and receive packets
simultaneously as long as all transmission rates are within
the specified bounds. In other words, a set of schedules Y is
a valid network schedule if and only if TA ≤ CA for every
node A.
Latency Constraint: We consider a strict delay constraint
on the packets, where the packet delay at each intermediate
relay in a route is bounded by ∆. In general, each relay
is allowed to reencrypt packets, reorder arrived packets and
transmit dummy packets. However, each received data packet
at a relay is required to be forwarded within ∆ time units of
arrival, or otherwise, dropped. Such a strict delay constraint
would apply in practice to time sensitive applications such as
target tracking in sensor networks or streaming media in peer
to peer networks. In general, a strict delay constraint would
prevent congestions in the network and ensure stability, albeit
at the cost of dropped packets.
Note that the schedules in Y only specify when packets
are transmitted by each node, and do not indicate which
packets actually travel from source to destination on each
route of a session. For every schedule, we therefore need
to specify a relaying strategy, represented by Z , which is a
set of subsequences of Y . The subsequences represent the
transmissions epochs of packets that are relayed from sources
to destinations and therefore, depend on the routes of the
session as well as the delay constraint.
Definition 2: Let a session S = (P1, · · · , P|S|), where Pi
= (A(i, 1), · · · , A(i,m(i))) is a valid path of length m(i),
and A(i, j) ∈ V represents the jth node in path Pi of session
S. A set of subsequences Z = {Zi,j : i ≤ |S|, j < m(i)} of
Y is a valid relaying strategy for S if:
1. ∀i, j Zi,j ⊆ YA(i,j).
2. For every i, j, n
0 ≤ Zi,j+1(n)− Zi,j(n) ≤ ∆.
3. If (A(i, j), A(i, j + 1)) = (A(l,m), A(l,m + 1)), then
Zi,j ∩ Zl,m = φ.
In the above definition, condition 2 ensures that the relayed
packets satisfy the delay constraint ∆ at every intermediate
relay from the sources to the destinations of the session.
Condition 3 ensures that, if any pair of nodes is common to
multiple routes, the subsequences picked from the transmission
schedules are mutually exclusive.
In Section III-C, we also consider a relaxed version of
the delay constraint, where the average delay of packets is
bounded at each relay. The definition for a relaying strategy
with average delay constraint can be obtained by modifying
condition 2 of Definition 2 as:
∀i, j, n Zi,j+1(n)− Zi,j(n) ≥ 0, (2)
lim
n→∞
n∑
m=1
Zi,j+1(m)− Zi,j(m)
n
≤ ∆¯. (3)
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(a) YX is the transmission schedule of Node
X .
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Fig. 3: 2× 1 Relay with Strict Delay Constraint
D. Performance Metrics
It is possible that the set of subsequences Z are a strict
subset of the transmissions schedule Y , or in other words, there
are epochs in Y that do not correspond to any relayed packets.
Those transmission epochs in Y that are not present in Z
would either correspond to packets that are dropped eventually,
or represent dummy packet transmissions. Therefore, for a
session s = (P1, · · · , P|s|) and relaying schedule Z , the rate
of packets relayed from source to destination on route Pi is
given by:
λ(Z, Pi) = lim
n→∞
n
Zi,1(n)
.
Note that, since condition 2 of Definition 2 ensures that all
schedules on a route have same length, it is sufficient to use
Zi,1 to compute rate.
Definition 3: Let the session vector s = (P1, · · · , Pk),
where Pi ∈ V n represents a valid path of data flow. Then,
a rate vector λ(s) = (λ1, · · · , λk) is achievable with strict
delay for session s if ∃q(Y|s) with anonymity α such that
1. Every realization of Y given s is a valid network
schedule.
2. For every realization of Y , there exists a valid relaying
strategy Z that satisfies
λ(Z, Pi) ≥ λi, ∀i. (4)
For a large network with several possible session vectors,
characterization of the set of rates for each path of each
session vector is potentially cumbersome. Furthermore, in
order to draw useful inferences on the relationship between
anonymity and network performance, it is helpful to have
a simpler quantity representing the achievable performance.
We, therefore, propose a scalar metric to characterize the
performance of large networks, defined by the average sum-
rate as follows.
Definition 4: R is defined to be a weakly achievable sum-
rate with anonymity α if ∃q(Y|S) with anonymity α such that
1. For every session s = {P1, · · · , P|s|}, every realization
of Y given s is a valid network schedule.
2. For every realization of (S,Y), there exists a valid
relaying strategy Z , and
E

 |S|∑
i=1
λ(Z, Pi)

 ≥ R, (5)
where the expectation is over the joint pdf of Y and S.
Note that the rate and sum-rate defined only represent the
rate of packets successfully relayed from sources to destina-
tions. Since the relaying strategy could result in packet drops
en route to the destinations, the reliability of the achievable
rates needs to be proved by specifying packet encoding and
decoding techniques. We address this issue using forward error
correction in Section III-D.
The fundamental design problem considered in this paper is
to characterize the set of achievable rates with anonymity α.
Specifically, we derive achievability results for two scenarios:
For the two hop network (as shown in Fig. 4), we characterize
the set of achievable rate vectors with maximum anonymity
(α = 1) under both delay constraints. For a general network,
we use the results from the two hop network and characterize
the weakly achievable sum-rate for a general α.
III. ANONYMOUS MULTIACCESS COMMUNICATION
In this section, we characterize the set of achievable
relay rates with maximum anonymity for the two-
hop network as shown in Fig. 4. In particular,
we provide rate regions for the session vector
sm = {(S1, B,D1), (S2, B,D2), · · · , (Sm, B,Dm)},
i.e. the sources S1, · · · , Sm transmit packets to destinations
D1, · · · , Dm through relay B.
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Fig. 4: Two Hop Network: Source Si transmits packets to
Di through B
A. Independent Scheduling
In accordance with the definition in Section II-B, schedul-
ing with perfect anonymity corresponds to the independence
between session vector S and the transmission schedules Y or
in other words,
H(S|Y) = H(S)⇒ S ⊥ Y.
We, therefore, propose an independent scheduling tech-
nique, wherein each node in the network generates a random
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transmission schedule, statistically independent of the session
and the schedules of other nodes in the network. For example,
in the network shown in Fig. 4 with m = 2
q(Y|S) = q1(YS1)q2(YS2)q3(YB),
where the distributions qi do not depend on S.
Independent scheduling is a particular solution to main-
taining anonymity in the two hop setup. An alternative to
independent scheduling would be the fixed scheduling as
described in [16]. Under that model, all the nodes follow a
fixed synchronous schedule irrespective of transmitted data
rates or paths of information flow. While the fixed scheduling
strategy guarantees maximum anonymity, it would result in
a large percentage of dummy packets for low traffic loads.
Further, a fixed schedule requires a centralized synchronous
implementation, which is impractical in large networks.
The relaying algorithms discussed in this section are not
specific to the statistics of the particular transmission processes
and some of the optimal properties hold for any pair of
point processes. However, for the purpose of analytical char-
acterization of relay rates, we have modeled the transmission
schedules to belong to independent Poisson point processes.
Poisson processes have typically been used to model the
arrival of packets to nodes in a network, due to memoryless
interarrival times property. Although Poisson schedules cannot
be shown to be optimal under strict delay constraints, under
certain conditions on the physical layer, they are shown to
be optimal for an average delay constraint. Our relaying
algorithms can be used on other point processes, such as Pareto
distributed schedules, however the analytical tractability is not
guaranteed.
B. Scheduling under Strict Delay
Consider the special case of a single source relay (Fig. 4,
m = 1). We are interested in the achievable relay rate for the
session s1 = {(S1, B,D1)}. The medium access constraints
are specified by the bounds TS1 ≤ CS1 , TB ≤ CB on the
transmission rates. If the delay constraint was absent (∆ =
∞), then each received packet can be relayed by B at the next
available epoch in its transmission schedule. Since packets can
be held for an indefinitely long time, the achievable relay rate
would be λ(Z, (S1, B,D1)) = min{CS1 , CB}. Note that this
is also the maximum possible rate if node B were to relay
packets without any anonymity requirement.
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Fig. 5: Bounded Greedy Match: Unmatched packets are
dropped, unused epochs have dummy packets
When a strict delay constraint of ∆ is imposed, we design
the relaying strategy using the Bounded Greedy Match (BGM)
algorithm proposed in [23] under the context of chaff insertion
in stepping stone attacks. The algorithm (Fig. 5) is described
in Table I. The basic idea is as follows: When a packet arrives
at B, if there exists a departure epoch within ∆ of the arrival
instant and has not been matched to any previous arrival, it
is assigned to the arrived packet. Otherwise, the packet is
dropped. If a relay epoch does not have any packet assigned
to it, the relay transmits a dummy packet at that epoch.
Let YS1 (n), YB(n) represent the arrival time of the nth packet from S1
and departure time of nth packet from B.
1. Initialize i = 1, j = 1.
2. Let t = min{YS1(i), YB(j)}.
3. If t = YB(j), then
i. B transmits a dummy packet at time YB(j).
ii. j = j + 1.
else if YB(j)− YS1(i) ≤ ∆
i. B transmits the ith packet from S1 at YB(j).
ii. i = i+ 1, j = j + 1.
else
i. Drop the ith packet that arrived from S1.
ii.i = i+ 1.
4. Repeat Step 2,3 until the end of the streams.
TABLE I: Bounded Greedy Match Algorithm
It was shown in [23] that this greedy algorithm resulted
in least packet drops. Based on the algorithm, the following
theorem characterizes the best achievable relay rate for a pair
of independent Poisson processes.
Theorem 1: If the nodes S1 and B generate independent
Poisson transmission schedules, the maximum achievable relay
rate from S1 to D1 through B is given by λ(Z, (S1, B,D1)) =
CS1(1 − ǫ(S1, B)) where
ǫ(S1, B) =
{ CB−CS1
CBe
−∆(CS1
−CB)−CS1
CS1 6= CB
1
1+CS1∆
CS1 = CB
,
△
= fe(CS1 , CB). (6)
Proof: Refer to Appendix.
Theorem 1 expresses the maximum achievable rate in terms
of the loss function ǫ(S1, B) where ǫ(S1, B) represents the
fraction of packets dropped at relay B. As the delay constraint
∆ increases, it is easy to see that the relay rate converges to
min{CS1 , CB} which is the optimal rate under no anonymity
requirement. Furthermore, the convergence of the relay rate to
the optimal value is exponential in ∆. The value of ǫ(S1, B)
given in Theorem 1 is obtained when S1 uses the maximum
transmission rate of CS1 for this particular route. In a general
network, S1 could be simultaneously transmitting to another
node, in which case, the rate allocated for YS1,B would
be strictly less than CS1 . In such a situation, by replacing
CS1 in (6) with the allocated rate for the particular flow,
we can use Theorem 1 to evaluate the corresponding relay rate.
m×1 Relay: For the general m×1 relay as shown in Fig. 4,
in the absence of the anonymity constraint, the achievable rate
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region can be obtained using the medium access constraints:
λ(sm) = {(λ1, · · · , λm) : λi ≤ CSi ∀i,
∑
i
λi ≤ CB}. (7)
For a finite delay constraint, a trivial achievable rate region
can be obtained if the relay ignores the originating source
of the arriving packets. Specifically, the relay uses the BGM
algorithm on the joint incoming schedule ⋃YSi,B and the
generated outgoing schedule YB . For this strategy, the single
source result in Theorem 1 can be easily extended to char-
acterize an achievable rate region for sm, which is given in
Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: There exists a relaying strategy for a m × 1
relay such that the achievable rates λ(sm) = (λ1, · · · , λm)
satisfy λi = Ti(1− ǫ(Si, B)), ∀i where
ǫ(Si, B) ≥ fe(
m∑
j=1
Tj, CB), ∀i (8)
Ti ≤ CSi , ∀i. (9)
Prioritized Scheduling Ignoring the source identities and
considering the joint stream is strictly sub-optimal. Since the
relay observes a distinct stream from each source node (by
virtue of transmitter directed signaling), the streams can be
prioritized to obtain a larger achievable rate region compared
to Corollary 1.
Consider a 2 × 1 relay and assign the highest priority to
S1. For every departure epoch in YB , the relay considers
all packets that have arrived within ∆ time units before that
epoch. If some of those packets arrived from S1 (highest
priority), the relay transmits the earliest of those packets at the
chosen epoch. If none of the packets arrived from S1, then the
packet that arrived first (from S2) is transmitted. Since S1 is
given highest priority, this would provide the maximum rate
achievable for the stream from S1. The priority algorithm is
formally described in Table II.
1. Initialize i = 1, j = 1, k = 1.
2. If YB(j)− ZS1,B(i) ≥ ∆
i. Drop ith packet from S1.
ii. i = i+ 1. Repeat Step 2.
3. Let t = min{ZS1,B(i), YB(j)}.
4. If t = YB(j)
i. Let t′ = min{ZS2,B(j), YB(k)}.
ii. If t′ = YB(k) then B transmit dummy packet at t′. k = k + 1.
else if ZS2,B(j) ≥ YB(k)−∆
B transmits jth packet from S2. j = j + 1, k = k + 1.
else
j = j + 1. Repeat Step 4.ii.
else
B transmits ith packet from S1. i = i+ 1, k = k + 1.
5. Repeat Steps 2-4 until end of streams.
TABLE II: Priority Mapping Algorithm: S1 highest priority
Similarly, by interchanging the priorities, we can obtain
the maximum rate for the stream from S2. It is easy to
see that, when none of the sources are given priority, it is
equivalent to ignoring the origin of packets (Corollary 1). By
time-sharing multiple relaying strategies with different priority
requirements, a piece-wise linear region of achievable rate
vectors is obtained, which is characterized in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: If λ(s2) = (λ1, λ2) represents the achievable
relay rates for sources S1 and S2 through relay B, then
1. (λ1, λ2) is achievable if
λ1 ≤ a1λ2 + b1, λ2 ≤ a2λ1 + b2, λi ≤ CSi(1− fe(CSi , CB)), (10)
where j 6= i and
ai =
CSi
CSj
+
CB [(1+∆(CB−CSi
−CSj
)−1]
CSi
(CBe
∆(CB−CSi
−CSj
)
−CB)(CBe
∆(CB−CSi
−CSj
)
−CSi
−CSj
)
, (11)
bi = (CSi − CSj )a1fe(CSi + CSj , CB). (12)
2. (λ1, λ2) is not achievable if∑
i
λi ≥ (CS1+CS2)(1−fe(CS1+CS2 , CB)), λi ≥ CSi(1−fe(CSi , CB)).
(13)
Proof: Refer to Appendix.
The priority scheduling cannot be proven to obtain the
optimal achievable rate region, and so Theorem 2 also provides
an outer bound to determine the extent of possible sub-
optimality. The outer bound is an upper bound on the sum
rate λ1+λ2 that is obtained using the optimality of the BGM
algorithm. It can be shown that as ∆→∞, the inner and outer
bounds coincide and converge exponentially fast. Although the
optimality of the region for Poisson processes is still an open
problem, the strategy achieves the maximum possible sum-
rate.
The prioritized scheduling can be extended to a general m×
1 relay. Every priority assignment corresponds to an ordering
of the sources. When packets from multiple sources contend
for a single epoch, the choice of packet to relay is made
according to the ordering. Further, by time-sharing strategies
for different priority assignments, the complete region can be
obtained.
0 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
4
Achievable Rate Region : CA
1
=3, CA
2
=4,CB=5
R1
R
2
Rate Region
Outer Bound
Corollary
Visible Relay
PSfrag replacements
S1 priority 1
S2 priority 1
priority 0
No secrecy
Ri
Rout
Fig. 6: 2× 1 Relay rate region. Ri is the rate
λ(Z, (Si, B,Di)). The inner and outer bounds
coincide at the maximal sum-rate point.
An example region for the 2 × 1 relay is shown in Fig. 6.
As is evident, the time-sharing strategy results in a piece-wise
linear and convex region. The two corner points of the polygon
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in the figure which represent the achievable rate-pairs when
S2, S1 are respectively given full priority, clearly demonstrate
the gains due to prioritized scheduling. Even when S1 is given
full priority, the relay rate for S2 is strictly positive. If no
priority is used, however, S1 can achieve maximum rate only
when S2 does not transmit at all (region of Corollary 1).
The maximum priority rate-pairs can also be viewed as the
outcome of successive application of the BGM algorithm on
the incoming streams from the two sources, with the order of
application determined from the priority assignment.
From theorems 1 and 2, it is clear that when CSi , CB
and ∆ are finite, the relay rates are strictly less than the
transmission rates, thereby resulting in a non-zero packet
drop rate. Therefore, the source needs to employ forward
error correction (FEC) in order to deliver information to the
destination reliably. It can be shown that for very long streams,
the coding does not result in further rate reduction (see Section
III-D).
C. Average Delay
In this section, we consider the average delay constraint
at a relay, as specified by (2) and (3). It is easy to see
that achievable rate regions for an average delay constraint
of ∆¯ can be trivially obtained by using the algorithms of
Section III-A that assume a strict delay of ∆¯. This trivial
strategy, however, can be significantly improved by modifying
the algorithms appropriately.
Consider the single source relay. Let m(∆, CS1 , CB) repre-
sent the mean packet delay obtained when the BGM algorithm
is applied with strict delay constraint ∆. Since we consider
infinitely long streams with an asymptotic constraint, we can
choose a strict delay constraint ∆∗ such that the mean delay
m(∆∗, CS1 , B) = ∆¯.
Theorem 3: λ(Z, (S1, B,D1)) = CS1(1 − ǫ(S1, B)) is an
achievable relay rate for an average delay constraint of ∆¯ if
ǫ(S1, B) ≥
{
fe(∆
∗, CS1 , CB) CB − CS1 ≤
1
∆¯
0 o.w.
and ∆∗ is the solution to m(∆∗, CS1 , CB) = ∆¯ where
m(∆∗, CS1 , CB) =
1 + e∆
∗(CS1−CB) [∆∗(CS1 − CB)− 1]
(CB − CS1)
[
1− e∆
∗(CS1−CB)
] .
Proof: Refer to Appendix
For values of ∆¯ close to zero, the strict delay constraint
∆∗ ≈ 2∆¯. Therefore, for very small delays, an average
delay constraint does not provide significant improvement in
achievable rate compared to a strict delay constraint. However,
as ∆¯ increases beyond a certain threshold, the equivalent
strict delay ∆∗ increases exponentially. In that regime, an
achievable rate close to optimal can be obtained even for a
bounded ∆¯. Furthermore, as is evident from the Theorem,
when CB − CS1 ≥ 1∆¯ , the strategy achieves zero packet
loss. In other words, every transmitted packet can be relayed
successfully within the (average) delay constraint.
Since we consider long streams, this strategy could poten-
tially be improved by dividing the stream into finite number
(N ) of segments, and implementing the BGM algorithm with
a different strict delay constraint (∆∗i ) in each segment (see
Fig. 7). The strict delay constraints should be chosen such
that the average delay Σim(∆
∗
i ,CS1 ,B))
N
is less than ∆¯. As the
length of the stream increases, each segment i would provide
an achievable relay rate λi = CSi(1 − fe(∆∗i , CSi , CB))
(Theorem 1) and the net achievable rate would be Σiλi
N
.
However, for a pair of Poisson processes, it can be shown that
λi is a convex function of the strict delay ∆∗i , and hence, this
segmentation does not reduce† packet loss for a fixed average
delay.
PSfrag replacements
λ1,∆∗1 λ
2,∆∗2 λ
N ,∆∗N
Fig. 7: Delay Segmentation: In each segment of the traffic, a
different strict delay ∆∗i is chosen.
Using the relation between the strict delay and average delay
in Theorem 3, the achievable region for the m × 1 relay
can also be obtained by appropriately modifying the strict
delay constraint in the prioritized scheduling. The condition on
transmission rates for which the priority scheduling strategy is
optimal for the m×1 relay case is a straightforward extension
of Theorem 3.
Corollary 2: There exists a scheduling strategy for average
delay ∆¯ that incurs zero packet loss on all incoming streams,
if the medium access constraints satisfy:
CB −
∑
i
CSi ≥
1
∆¯
.
From the results presented so far, it is clear that while
independent Poisson scheduling generally provides a subset
of achievable relay rates for strict delay constraints, under
certain conditions on the medium access, it can be optimal
for an average delay constraint. An important feature in
the algorithms presented is that the relays do not require
prior knowledge about transmission schedules of the source
nodes. The decision to transmit any packet is based on events
occurring between its arrival time and the subsequent departure
epoch. This makes it particularly attractive for a decentralized
implementation of the scheduling, which is of particular value
in adhoc wireless and sensor networks. Note that although
the rate expressions derived are for Poisson processes, the
algorithms presented are quite general, and can be used on
any set of point processes. Furthermore, the optimality of the
BGM algorithm also holds for any pair of point processes.
D. Reliability
The independent schedules and relaying algorithms dis-
cussed previously result in strictly non-zero packet drop rate
for Poisson processes. Further, since the relay nodes generate
schedules in a decentralized manner, it is not possible for the
source node to know the identities of packets that would be
†This convexity may not hold for non-Poisson schedules, in which case,
the segmentation could potentially increase the achievable relay rate.
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dropped. This implies that the source nodes must employ for-
ward error correction (FEC) techniques to transmit information
reliably to the destination. When the traffic is time sensitive
such as in media transmission, FEC may not be practical, as
it would incur significant coding delay. However, if the strict
delay constraint is enforced due to low duty cycles (as in
sensor networks) or to maintain stability, it is useful to employ
coding to ensure reliability of transmission.
In order to analyze the reliability of packet transmissions,
it is necessary to characterize the channel model between a
source and destination. For this purpose, if we treat each
packet as a binary unit of data, then the packet drops can
be equated to a binary erasure channel. Since packets can be
appended with indices, the erasure positions would be known
at the destination node.
Consider a relay node forwarding packets from a single
source. Let E(i) denote the random variable indicating that
packet i was successfully relayed when applying the BGM
relay algorithm. Then, using Proposition 4 in [24], it can be
shown that the relay rate obtained from Theorem 1 can be
achieved reliably.
Lemma 1: The capacity C of the erasure channel for a
single source relay after applying the BGM algorithm is
C = 1− lim supn
1
n
∑
i≤n
E(i) = 1− ǫ(S1, B),
where ǫ(S1, B) is given by (6).
Proof: Refer to Appendix.
The achievability of this reliable rate, however, requires
coding across a long stream of packets. Since prioritized
scheduling is equivalent to successive application of the BGM
algorithm, the rate region of Theorem 2 also represent reliable
rates. In practice, a packet is not a unit of data and the
FEC is different from regular point to point communication
channels. Coding for packet recovery in networks has been
addressed in literature [25], [26]. In particular, in [25], the
authors propose coding schemes, where, for every block of
information packets, parity packets are transmitted such that
∀i, the ith bit from each packet arranged in sequence forms a
codeword from an erasure correcting codebook.
IV. SUM-RATE SECRECY REGION
The achievability results presented in the previous section
can be viewed as the basic building blocks for hiding routes
in a network. While the independent scheduling idea can
be directly extended to multihop routes, characterizing rate
regions for large networks is cumbersome and not practical.
Furthermore, Theorem 2 in [27] shows that under certain
conditions, for an n−hop path with independent Poisson
schedules, the maximum rate of packets that can be relayed
to the destination with strict delay constraint decays exponen-
tially as n increases. Therefore, instead of directly extending
the idea, we propose to utilize independent scheduling at
selected portions of the network depending on the required
level of anonymity α.
As an example, consider the switching network shown in
Fig. 8. During any network session, each source Si picks a
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 8: Switching Network: Sources {Si} transmit packets to
destinations {Di} through relays {Mi}.
distinct destination Dj . It is easy to see that given the Si, Dj
pairings, there is a unique set of paths in the session S. If no
anonymity is required, each relay would transmit a received
packet after a negligible processing delay, thereby incurring
no packet drops. Assuming each node has a transmission rate
of C, the average sum-rate achievable would be 2C (min-
cut would be out of M1,M3). Since the schedules of all the
relays are dependent on the arrival processes, the eavesdropper
would be able to detect the relaying operation of the nodes
M1, · · · ,M4. However, since nodes utilize transmitter directed
signaling with encrypted headers, the eavesdropper would not
be able to ascertain the final destination nodes of any path. In
this case, it can be shown that the anonymity level H(S|Y)
H(S) =
.436.
On the other hand, complete independent scheduling would
imply that the relays M1, · · · ,M4 generate statistically inde-
pendent schedules. Such a strategy would provide maximum
anonymity α = 1, but result in a reduced achievable sum-rate
given by 2C(1 − ǫ1)(1 − ǫ2), where ǫ1, ǫ2 are packet losses
incurred at relays M1,M3 and M2,M4 respectively.
Suppose, only M1,M3 were to generate independent sched-
ules, while M2,M4 relayed packets immediately, the eaves-
dropper would be able to observe a portion of the paths. In that
case, it can be shown that the anonymity level H(S|Y)
H(S) = .65
(refer to Appendix for details). However since only one relay
in each path drops packets, the achievable sum-rate, however,
increases to 2C(1− ǫ1).
This simple example illustrates the trade-off between
achievable network performance and the level of anonymity.
In the remainder of this section, we shall formalize these
ideas, describe a randomized relaying strategy and provide
an analytical characterization of the achievable sum-rate as a
function of anonymity.
A. Relay Categories
As suggested in the example, the key idea we exploit is to
divide the set of relays according to their scheduling strategies.
Specifically, we categorize the relays into two types: covert
and visible relays.
Covert Relays: A relay M is covert, if it generates a trans-
mission schedule statistically independent of the schedules of
all nodes occurring previously in the paths that contain M .
For example, if only path P = {A1, · · · , Ak,M,Ak+1, · · · }
contains M , then M is covert if its transmission schedule is
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Fig. 9: Visible and Covert Relaying.
independent of schedules of A1, · · · , Ak. Further, if M relays
packets from k nodes, then it uses the BGM algorithm on the
joint incoming packet stream to optimally match the departure
epochs. Since our criterion is to maximize sum-rate, the nodes
are given equal priority which is the sum-rate optimal strategy
(Theorem 2).
Visible Relays: A visible relay M generates its schedule
based on the schedules of nodes transmitting packets to M .
For every received packet, the relay schedules an epoch after a
processing delay (negligible compared to ∆). It is evident that
a relay operating under this highly correlated schedule would
be easily detected by an eavesdropper. It is important to note
that, although some received packets from the transmitting
node may be dummy packets, these are also relayed by
a visible node. The reason is that, if dummy packets that
were generated due to independent scheduling at a previous
node were to be dropped by the visible relay, then the new
stream would no longer be independent from the node two
hops earlier (see Fig. 10). We assume that for visible relays,
the eavesdropper makes a perfect detection of the relaying
operation.
PSfrag replacements
Visible RelayCovert Relay
Y1 Y2 Y3
Fig. 10: Relaying Dummy Packets: Y1 and Y2 are
statistically independent. If the dummy packets
(represented in green) are not relayed, the processes
Y1 and Y3 will be dependent.
By appropriately selecting which relays should be covert in
a session, we can guarantee the required level of anonymity.
A trivial strategy would be to let all nodes act as covert relays
in a session. However, since the independent schedules would
result in packet loss at every covert relay, network throughput
would be reduced significantly. It is, therefore, necessary
to pick the covert relays optimally so that anonymity is
guaranteed with minimum loss in throughput.
We assume the transmission times of packets by each source
node in a session are generated according to an independent
Poisson process. To maintain uniformity in traffic schedule
patterns, we let the covert relays also generate independent
Poisson processes. Given a session S, let B represent the set
of relay nodes that are chosen to be covert. Given S,B, using
the relaying algorithms discussed in the previous section, the
schedules Y and the relayed subsequences Z can be generated
for all nodes in the network.
B. Eavesdropper Observation
We assume that when a relay is visible, the eavesdropper
perfectly correlates the schedules transmitted by a preceding
node and the relay. As a result, depending on the set of
visible relays, the eavesdropper makes a partial detection on
the paths of a session. We denote this partial observation
as a set of paths, Sˆ ∈ 2P(G). Given the observation Sˆ, the
eavesdropper would try and infer the actual session S. The
partial observation Sˆ can be expressed as a function of the
actual session S and the set of covert relays B.
We define function t : 2P(G) × V → 2P(G) to characterize
the eavesdropper’s observation when at most one relay is
covert. For a set of paths P, t(P, B) contains the observed
paths when only node B is covert. If B = φ, then t(P, φ)
is obtained by removing the destination nodes from every
path in P. This is because, even if all relays are visible,
transmitter directed signaling ensures that it is not possible
to detect the final destination in any route. If B 6= φ, then a
path P ∈ P(G) belongs to t(P, B) if and only if it satisfies
one of the following conditions:
1. ∃P ′ = (A1, · · · , Ak, B,Ak+1, · · · , An) ∈ P, such that
P = (A1, · · · , Ak) or P = (B,Ak+1, · · · , An).
2. P ∈ P and B /∈ P .
Condition 1 states that, when a path in P contains a covert
relay, the eavesdropper would observe two different paths, one
terminating before B and the other originating from node B.
Condition 2 states that a path that does not contain a covert
relay is fully observed. When a subset B = (B1, · · · , Bm) ⊂
V of relays are covert, then Sˆ can be obtained by repeated
application of t:
Sˆ = t(· · · (t(t(S, φ), B1) · · · ), Bm)
△
= T(S,B). (14)
It can be shown that the set Sˆ in the above equation,
represents the eavesdropper’s sufficient statistic (part of the
proof of Theorem 4).
C. Throughput Function
In order to design the optimal selection strategy, we first
characterize the loss in sum-rate when a deterministic set of
relays are covert in a session. The relaying strategies in Section
III-A were designed to minimize the packet loss at a single
covert relay. Extending those results to multihop routes, we
can characterize the loss in sum-rate of each session S, when
a subset of relays B are covert.
If we ignore the anonymity requirement, the best throughput
in the network is achieved when all relays are visible. Each
session S corresponds to a maximum achievable sum-rate
obtained using the max-flow that satisfies medium access
constraints. Specifically, let λv(S) = (λv1 , · · · , λv|S|) represent
the vector of achievable relay rates for the paths in session S
with no covert relays, and Λv(S) be the maximum achievable
sum-rate.
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If S = (P1, · · · , P|S|), then, using the forwarding strategy
for visible relays, the maximum achievable sum-rate is the
solution to:
Λ
v(S) = max(λv1 + · · ·+ λ
v
k), (15)∑
i:B∈Pi
λvi ≤ CB , ∀B ∈ V. (16)
Therefore our performance metric when anonymity α = 0
is the maximum expected sum-rate given by,
R(α = 0) = E(Λv(S)),
where the expectation is over the prior p(S). Although in
practice, the actual rates of flows are dependent on the nature
of data and network application, the maximum sum-rate is
a metric that represents the fundamental limits of achievable
performance.
When a subset of relays are covert, the achievable sum-
rate in each session is reduced depending on the fraction of
packets dropped at each covert relay. The net relay rate for
each path is obtained by multiplying the fraction of packets
that are relayed at every covert relay in that path.
Specifically, let λc(S,B) = (λc1, · · · , λc|S|) represent the
achievable relay rates from sources to destinations for a session
S = (P1, · · · , P|S|), when nodes in B are covert, and let
Λ
c(S,B)
△
=
∑|S|
i=1 λ
c
i be the achievable sum-rate. If A(i, j)
represents the jth node in path Pi, then
λci = λ
v
i
∏
j:A(i,j)∈B∩Pi
(1− ǫi(A(i, j − 1), A(i, j))) .(17)
where ǫi(A,B) represents the fraction of packets transmitted
by node A on path Pi, that are dropped by covert relay B. Note
that Theorems 1 and 2 provide the closed form expression for
ǫi(A,B), if B is the first covert relay in the path i. Since the
departure epochs of data packets from a covert relay do not
constitute a Poisson process, the expression cannot be applied
to subsequent covert relays. The analytical characterization of
multiple covert relays is generally cumbersome, but can be
obtained numerically.
Although the solution of the optimization in ((15),(16))
specifies a set of transmission rates for the nodes, we know
from Theorems 1 and 2 that, increasing the transmission
rates of nodes results in lower packet losses for statistically
independent schedules. Therefore, if the relay immediately
following a source node is covert, the source node could
transmit at the maximum rate possible to minimize packet
losses. In other words, if A is a source node, then TA =∑
i:A∈Pi
λvi can be increased to CA. Since only the source is
allowed to perform forward error correction, it does not help to
increase transmission rates of subsequent relays (as we would
only get additional dummy packets).
V. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERIZATION
With the eavesdropper observation of (14) and throughput
characterization in (17), we now have all the elements required
to maximize throughput with anonymity α. Prior to describ-
ing the general randomized strategy, to ease understanding,
we first discuss a simple deterministic strategy to obtain a
smaller region of achievable sum-rate anonymity pairs. Then,
expanding on that idea, we provide the generalized strategy to
characterize the sum-rate anonymity region.
Deterministic Covert Scheduling: A direct optimization of
(17) provides a deterministic strategy to characterize achiev-
able sum-rates under anonymity constraints. Specifically, a
subset B of relays is chosen to remain covert for all sessions,
such that the sum-rate is maximized without violating the
anonymity requirement.
Theorem 4: A sum-rate R is achievable with anonymity α
if
R ≤ max
B:H(S|Sˆ)≥α
E[Λc(S,B)],
where Sˆ = T(S,B).
Proof: Refer to Appendix
Depending on the level of anonymity required, the strategy
picks one subset of nodes that are always covert (for all
sessions). Since the number of possible subsets is finite,
the achievable sum-rate anonymity region would be constant
within intervals of α, with sudden jumps corresponding to a
change in the optimal subset (see example in Section VI).
The above theorem provides one set of achievable sum-rates
as a function of anonymity α. As mentioned in Section II-B,
equivocation is an average metric. It gives a lower bound on
the average probability of error for the adversary. Furthermore,
the performance is also measured by an average sum-rate
metric. Therefore, by time-sharing multiple strategies, it is
possible to obtain a convex region without violating the
anonymity constraint.
For example, let two subsets of covert relays B1 and B2
correspond to achievable sum-rate anonymity pairs R1, α1
and R2, α2. At the beginning of every session, one of the
subsets B1,B2 are chosen with probability 12 . Then, it is
possible to obtain an achievable sum-rate anonymity pair
(R1+R22 ,
α1+α2
2 ). In general, any convex combination of sum-
rate anonymity pairs is achievable by time-sharing.
Corollary 3: Let
Rdet = {(R,α) : R is an achievable sum-rate with anonymity α}.
Then, every (R,α) ∈ convex-hull(Rdet) is achievable.
Randomized Covert Scheduling: The drawback in the strate-
gies discussed above is that the subsetB is chosen independent
of the session S. The generalized strategy is to chose the set
of covert relays as a random function of the session S. We
model the set of covert relays B as a random variable with
a conditional probability mass function {q(B|S) : B ∈ 2V }.
The goal is to optimize the conditional p.m.f {q(B|S)} so
that achievable sum-rate is maximized for a given level of
anonymity α. Obtaining the best distribution could typically be
done using a brute force optimization over a large dimensional
simplex, which is computationally intensive, and impractical
for large networks. However, the following result proves the
duality of this problem to information theoretic rate-distortion,
which can then be used to efficiently obtain the optimal
strategy and characterize the optimal sum-rate R(α).
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 12
Theorem 5: Let d : 2P × 2P →R s.t.
d(S, Sˆ) =
{
Λ
v(S)−Λc(S,B) ∃B s.t. Sˆ = T (S,B)
∞ o.w.
(18)
Then, a sum-rate R(α) is achievable with anonymity α if
R(0)−R(α) ≥ D (H(S)(1− α)) ,
where D(r) is the Distortion-Rate function defined as
D(r) = min
q(Sˆ|S):I(S;Sˆ)≤r
E(d(S, Sˆ)). (19)
Proof: Refer to Appendix.
The above theorem provides R(α) using the single letter
characterization of a rate-distortion function. The loss function
d(S, Sˆ) represents the reduction in sum-rate due to covert
relaying. Although the loss function parameters do not ex-
plicitly include the set of covert relays B, it can be shown
that given S, Sˆ, the set of covert relays B is unique (see
proof of Theorem 4). Therefore, the distribution q(B|S) to
chose covert relays is equivalent to the distortion minimizing
distribution in (19). As a result, the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm
[28] provides an efficient iterative technique to obtain q(B|S)
and the achievable sum-rate R(α). Note that the anonymity α
is guaranteed assuming that the eavesdropper is aware of the
network topology, the session prior distribution p(S) and the
optimal strategy q(B|S) of choosing covert relays.
A. Discussion
The equivalence between anonymous networking and rate
distortion is not tied to our strategy of choosing covert relays,
as explained in Section I-A. In our model, the level of
anonymity α directly corresponds to the rate of compression
and the performance loss function plays the role of distortion.
Therefore, obtaining the optimal rate-distortion function is
equivalent to obtaining the throughput anonymity relation.
We believe that the consequences of this duality extend
beyond the characterization of the tradeoff between anonymity
and throughput. Rate distortion is a field that has been studied
for many decades [21], and the numerous models and tech-
niques developed therein could serve to design strategies for
anonymous networking. For example, in our setup, the Blahut-
Arimoto algorithm provides an efficient iterative technique to
obtain the optimal distribution of covert relays in a session.
In our current setup, we have considered independent ses-
sions of observation, which may not apply to the scenario
where an eavesdropper monitors the network for long periods
of time. In that case, we would need a stochastic model to
account for session changes, depending on when nodes start
or stop communication. Based on the duality we believe that,
if we adopt a Markovian model for the session evolution, then
techniques in causal source coding [29] would provide possible
solutions.
We currently model the entire session as a single entity
(the variable S) which may not be practical to analyze in a
large scale network. This model should be broken down to
protecting each route independently, depending on the level
of anonymity required by that particular route. One approach
towards such a model would be to express the set of routes as
sequence of links, rather than a single session variable. Each
session would then be correspond to a source sequence, and
the distortion measure would depend on the relative levels of
anonymity required by routes. The challenge in developing
such a model, however, is to account for eavesdroppers cor-
relating schedules across multiple hops.
VI. EXAMPLE
Consider the switching example given in the beginning of
Section IV (Fig. 8). During any network session, each source
Si picks a distinct destination Di. The set of sessions S,
contains 24 elements which are assumed equiprobable. For this
example, Fig. 11 plots the sum-rate anonymity region for the
deterministic and probabilistic strategies discussed previously.
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Fig. 11: Sum-Rate Anonymity Region for 4× 4 switching
network with C = 2.
The sum-rate anonymity relationship is convex as seen in
the figure. This is because the performance metrics, namely
anonymity and throughput, are average quantities, which al-
lows time-sharing to convexify any set of achievable rates. The
figure clearly demonstrates the performance improvement due
to the randomized covert scheduling. As can be seen, when
all relays are visible, the maximum sum-rate 2C is achieved
with a strictly positive secrecy level. This is because, given the
transmission stream from relay M2 (or M4), it is not possible
for the eavesdropper to detect which packets are received by
each destination node. Another interesting observation is that
it suffices to make relays M2,M4 covert in order to obtain
perfect anonymity. This shows that, although making all relays
covert ensures perfect secrecy, it may not be necessary.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
One of our key contributions in this work is the theoretical
model for anonymity against traffic analysis. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first analytical metric designed to
measure the secrecy of routes in an eavesdropped wireless
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network. Based on the metric, we designed scheduling and
relaying strategies to maximize network performance with a
guaranteed level of anonymity. Although we consider specific
constraints on delay and bandwidth, the ideas of covert re-
laying and the randomized selection are quite general, and
apply to arbitrary multihop wireless networks. The throughput-
anonymity tradeoff we obtain reiterates the known paradigm of
inverse relationship between communication rate and secrecy
in covert channels.
In this work, we used throughput as an indicator of net-
work performance and optimized the selection strategy. How-
ever, the framework we establish extends beyond maximizing
throughput. In fact, the loss function we define in (18) can
be redefined to represent the loss in any convex function of
the achievable relay rates. Further, instead of fixing the packet
delay and minimizing the loss in sum-rate, we could fix the
rates of transmission and analyze the increase in latency at
every covert relay. By optimally designing the loss function
to reflect the increase in overall network latency, we would
be able to derive the relationship between latency and level of
anonymity.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the theorem, we adopt the technique used in [20].
Consider the two point processes YS1 ,YB . Let Xj be the jth
packet delay, i.e. Xj = YB(j)− YS1(j). Define
Zj
△
= Xj−Xj−1 = (YS1(j)−YB(j−1))−(YS1(j)−YB(j−1)).
We see that Zj’s are i.i.d. random variables; each Zj is
the difference between two independent exponential random
variables with mean 1/CB and 1/CS1 , respectively. The
process {Xj}∞j=1 is a general random walk with step Zj .
Define X0 = 0.
Now for every dummy packet transmitted at t in YB , we
insert a virtual packet at t in YS1 ; for every packet dropped
at time s in YS1 , we insert a virtual packet at s + ∆ in YB .
Let the new packet delays after the insertion of virtual packets
be {X ′j}∞j=0. It can be shown that {X ′j}∞j=0 is also a random
walk with step Zj , but it has two absorbing barriers at 0 and
∆, i.e.
X ′j = min(max(X
′
j−1 + Zj, 0), ∆).
Since it is almost surely impossible for X ′j−1 + Zj to be
exactly equal to 0 or ∆, each time X ′j = 0 corresponds to
a dummy transmission in YB , and X ′j = ∆ corresponds to a
dropped packet in YS1 . From example 2.16 in [30], we know
that the probability of X ′j = ∆ is given by
Pr{X ′j = ∆} =
1−
TS1
TB
TB
TS1
e−∆(TS1−TB) −
TS1
TB
= Pr{X ′j = 0}.
Therefore, the fraction of dropped packets in YS1 is
ǫA =
Pr{X ′i = ∆}
(1 − Pr{X ′i = 0})
=
TB − TS1
TBe
−∆(TS1−TB) − TS1
.
By replacing the transmission rates TSi , TB with the max-
imum values CSi , CB , the theorem is proved. In [23], the
authors have shown that the BGM algorithm inserts the least
chaff fraction for any pair of point processes. Hence, for any
(TS1 , TB), it is impossible to obtain a higher information relay
rate than (6). This procedure can be extended to multihop by
considering multidimensional random walk, but closed form
evaluation of the relay rates is cumbersome, even for a few
hops.
✷
Proof of Theorem 2
2. The outer bound is obtained using the optimality of BGM
algorithm. Let node Si transmit at rates CSi . Then, the sum
information relay rate obtained by using the BGM algorithm
on the joint incoming process is given by:
∑
i
λi = (CS1 + CS2)(1− fe
(∑
i
CSi , CB
)
. (20)
Since BGM inserts the least fraction of dummy packets[23],
this is the maximum sum-rate achievable for the given trans-
mission rates. For each individual source Si, the best rate
possible is obtained if the other source is completely ignored.
Therefore, by replacing
∑
j CSj by CSi in (20), we can obtain
the remaining conditions that specify the outer bound.
✷
1. Let the zero priority region of Corollary 1 be represented
by R0. Every point on the boundary of R0, is obtained by
letting one node transmit at the highest rate and varying
the transmission rate of the other source node from 0 to
the maximum value CSi . This is a special case of priority
mapping; the reduced rate for a node is equivalent to marking a
fraction of epochs (in a full rate transmission) to be given equal
priority. If we forget about the unmarked epochs, then the
rate region is identical to Corollary 1. However the unmarked
epochs owing to unused transmissions in the output schedule
still have a chance of being relayed and the BGM algorithm
can be used between the unmarked epochs of the input and
unused epochs of the output. This successive application of
BGM amounts to time-sharing between the zero priority and
high priority strategies. Since the point on the boundary of R0
has a reduced rate of transmission for one node, it is strictly
in the interior of priority achievable rate region. Therefore,
the bounding convex polygon forms an inner bound to the
best achievable rate region. Evaluating the tangents at the
maximum sum-rate point of Corollary 1 yield the expressions
in Theorem 2.
✷
Proof of Theorem 3
Consider the modified point processes as defined in the
proof of Theorem 1. X ′i denotes the ith step size of the
random walk between two absorbing barriers. The average
delay incurred by the BGM algorithm is equal to the expected
mean size of the random walk without including the steps that
hit either boundaries. Following the exposition in example 2.16
in ([30], Page 67), the cumulative distribution of the step size
(or delay ∆i) in the interval (0,∆) is given by
Pr(Xi ≤ x) =
1−
CS1
CB
exp(∆∗ + x)(CS1 − CB)
1−
C2
S1
C2
B
exp(∆∗(CS1 − CB))
. (21)
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Using the expression above, the average delay ∆¯ for the BGM
algorithm with strict delay ∆ can be evaluated as:
∆¯ = E{X ′i|X
′
i ∈ (0,∆
∗)}
=
1 + exp(∆∗(CS1 − CB)) [∆
∗(CS1 − CB)− 1]
(CB − CS1) [1− exp(∆
∗(CS1 − CB))]
.
If CB > CS1 , then as ∆∗ →∞,
∆¯ =
1 + exp(∆∗(CS1 − CB))∆
∗(CS1 − CB)
(CB − CS1) [1− exp(∆
∗(CS1 − CB))]
=
1
CB − CS1
.
This implies that if ∆¯ > 1
CB−CS1
, then the BGM algorithm
with ∆∗ = ∞ would be sufficient, and more importantly,
optimal. It is easy to see that for small values of ∆, the
average delay ∆¯ ≈ ∆∗2 . In other words, when the allowed
delay is very small, relaxing the constraint does not provide
significant improvement.
✷
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the modified point processes as defined in the
proof of Theorem 1. X ′i denotes the ith step size of the random
walk between two absorbing barriers. Consider a subsequence
Xˆi of X ′i, wherein Z ′ contains all points in X ′ that are
strictly greater than 0. In other words Xˆi does not represent
any dummy packets. Accordingly the erasure variable E(i) =
10<Xˆi<∆ because a packet is relayed whenever the random
walk does not hit either barriers. Since the point processes
are renewal processes, the resulting random walk is stationary
and the distribution for X ′i given by (21). Therefore the erasure
E(i) is a stationary and ergodic Markov chain and the capacity
of the erasure channel is given by
lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
i
E(i) = 1− Pr{Xˆi = ∆}
= 1−
Pr{X ′i = ∆}
(1 − Pr{X ′i = 0})
= 1−
1−
TS1
TB
TB
TS1
e−∆(TS1−TB) −
TS1
TB
= 1− ǫ(S1, B).
✷
Proof of Theorem 4
From (17), we know that λc(S,B) is an achievable relay
rate vector when nodes in B are covert. It remains to be seen
that the condition H(S|Sˆ) ≥ α guarantees an anonymity α.
For this purpose, it is sufficient to show that
H(S|Y) ≤ H(S|Sˆ).
Let Yˆ be the schedules generated assuming Sˆ was a session
and none of the nodes were covert. The transmission rates of
nodes in Yˆ are assumed identical to Y . For the nodes that
are the sources in S, the schedules are independent in Y and
Yˆ . Session Sˆ has additional sources due to the broken paths,
which also generate independent transmission schedules. The
set of these additional sources is identical to the set of covert
relays in S. Therefore, the schedules are independent in Y
as well. Since the remaining nodes relay all received packets
within negligible processing delay, p(Y|S) = p(Yˆ|S). Then,
using the data processing inequality (S− Sˆ− Yˆ)
H(S|Y) = H(S|Yˆ) ≤ H(S|Sˆ).
✷
Proof of Theorem 5
Consider the optimal solution q∗(Sˆ|S) of the distortion rate
problem,
D = min
q(Sˆ|S):I(S;Sˆ)≤(1−α)H(S)
E(d(S, Sˆ)).
From the definition of d(S, Sˆ), it is easy to see that if
∄B s.t. Sˆ = T(S,B), then q∗(Sˆ|S) = 0. Given S, Sˆ, we can
show that the set of covert relays B are uniquely determined,
using the following argument:
Suppose ∃B1 6= B2 such that T(S,B1) = T(S,B2). Then,
we can write B1 = (B,B′1),B2 = (B,B′2) where B′1 =
(B11, · · · , B1m), B
′
2 = (B21, · · · , B2n) and B′1
⋂
B
′
2 = φ.
We know that
Sˆ(S,B1) = t(· · · t(T(S,B), B11), · · · ), B1m)
= t(· · · t(T(S,B), B21), · · · ), B2n) = Sˆ(S,B2).
Suppose none of the paths in T(S,B) contain B′1
⋃
B
′
2,
then it does not matter if those relays are covert or not, in
which case the subset of covert relays would be B.
If ∃P ∈ T(S,B) that contains B11, then T(S,B1) would
contain a path that ends in B11, whereas T(S,B2) cannot
contain such a path. Therefore, we have a contradiction.
The above argument shows that we can equivalently write
q∗(Sˆ|S) = q∗(B|S). Therefore, q∗ specifies a valid selection
strategy. Since H(S) is fixed apriori, I(S; Sˆ) ≤ (1−α)H(S)
ensures that an anonymity α is guaranteed. Further, for every
B, the function d evaluates the difference in achievable rate
vectors λ
v
(S) and λc(S, B). Taking expectation over q∗(B|S),
it is easy to see that the distortion D is achievable with
α−anonymity.
✷
Switching Network Example
When all relays are visible, the eavesdropper would
not know the final node of any route. This implies that
given an observation, 4 possible source-destination pairings
would be equally likely. This implies that his uncertainty
H(S|Y) = log(4). Since the priors are equally likely
H(S) = log(24). Therefore, when all relays are visible,
α = log(4)log(24) = .436.
When M1,M3 are covert, the number of
possible pairings given an observation would
depend on the session. For example, if
{(S1,M1,M2, D1),(S2,M1,M2, D2),(S3,M3,M4, D3),
(S4,M3,M4, D4)} is the session, then the eavesdropper
would be able to identify that all transmissions from
M1 are relayed by M2, and his uncertainty would
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be log(4). This is identical to 7 other pairings
(whenever S1, S2 use the same set of relays). Suppose
{(S1,M1,M2, D1), (S2,M1,M4, D3),(S3,M2,M3, D2),
(S4,M2,M4, D4)} was the session, then it would be
indistinguishable from the 15 remaining sessions (whenever
S1, S2 do not use the same set of relays), and his uncertainty
would increase to log(16). Therefore, since all sessions are
equally probable,
H(S|Y)
H(S)
=
(1/3) log(4) + (2/3) log(16)
log(24)
= 0.659.
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